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HAPHAZARD REGIMENTATION'UNDER
LICENSING STATUTES
FRANK HANFT* AND J. NATHANIEL HAMRICK**
In the wake of the professions, numbers of trades and crafts are
surging forward to obtain for themselves the benefit of licensing statutes.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina gave the judicial green light
and go signal to this sort of legislation in a recent case' pronouncing
constitutional a statute providing for the examination and licensing of
photographers. It is therefore timely to examine the nature and extent
of the activity thus sanctioned.
This article will be concerned with statutes which require those en-
gaging in professions, businesses, trades, and other occupations to obtain
permission first from some- governmental agency. The permission may
take the form of a license, permit, certificate, or like stamp of approval.
It may 'be given by some regular officer or agency of the government,
or it may be 'granted by a body created for the purpose. The special
body may be, and frequently is, required by the statute to be drawn
from the ranks of those engaged in the regulated calling. As a condi-
tion to obtaining the license, requirements must be met which are de-
signed to regulate those entering the calling. The particular statute
may authorize the licensing officer or body to impose further regulations
on the licensed occupation, or the statute may itself contain additional
regulations. Commonly the license or other permission may be revoked
for cause.
Revenue licenses, that is, licenses which may be obtained simply by
paying license taxes, will not be considered herein. Neither will licenses
to participate in some form of governmental bounty, such as licenses to
graze animals on public lands; nor licenses to perform acts not amount-
ing to businesses or means of livelihood, such as licenses to hunt, drive
cars, marry, etc. This article is concerned only with licensing or other
governmental permission as a device to regulate businesses, professions,
trades, and such occupations.
The long list of occupations so regulated in North Carolina grows
rapidly longer.2 Already included in such regulation are lawyers, 3
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
** Member, Student Board of Editors, North Carolina Law Review.
'State v. Lawrence, 213 N. C. 674, 197 S. E. 586 (1938).
'Statutory Changes in North Carolina Law in 1925 (1925) 3 N. C. L. Ray.
129, 147; A Survey of Statutory Changes in North Carolina in 1937 (1937) 15
N. C. L. Rv. 321, 326.3 N. C. CODE ANx. (Michie, 1935) §§215 (10), 1941. The sections cited in
this and the next succeeding footnotes do not include the entire statute regulating
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public utilities,4 liquor wholesalers,5 persons engaged in slaughtering,
architects,7 auctioneers,3 barbers,9 threshers,' 0 collectors,"' plumbing
and heating contractors,' 2 building and loan associations,' 3 land and
loan associations,' 4 credit unions, 15 cosmetologists (beauty operators),'o
engineers and land surveyors, 17 insurance, bonding, investment, dividend,
guarantee, registry, title guarantee, debenture, and like companies,'$ in-
surance agents and adjusters,' 9 fidelity and fiduciary companies, 20 title
insurance companies,2 ' title insurance companies and land mortgage
companies issuing collateral loan certificates, 2 2 non-profit life benefit
associations, 2 3 fraternal benefit societies, 24 physicians and surgeons, 25
dentists, 26 mouth hygienists, 27 pharmacists, 28 optometrists, 20 osteo-
paths, 30 chiropractorsal nurses,3 2 midwives, 83 veterinarians, 34 chiropo-
dists (foot healers), 35 embalmers,30 pilots,37 pawnbrokers,8 photog-
raphers,30 public accountants,4 0 employment agencies, 4 ' dealers in
scrap tobacco,4 2 contractors,4 3 correspondence and commercial schools, 44
solicitors for such schools, 45 tile contractors, 40 electrical contractors,
47
dry cleaners, 43 burial associations, 49 mattress manufacturers,50 and real
estate brokers and salesmen. 51 Moreover, municipalities may license such
enterprises as pool and billiard rooms,52 dance halls,5 3 and liquor retail-
ing.54 Counties may license auctioneers,5 5 and liquor retailers.50
The above catalogue of occupations, ranging from the most im-
portant professions to the most obscure trades, will suffice to show the
extent and diversity of the callings closed in North Carolina to those
who are unable to secure official permission. The situation in other
each of the occupations concerned. The object is to specify a section from the
statute verifying the existence of regulation through licensing or other govern-
mental permission.
'N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §§1037(d), 2613(1).
rId. §3411(7). 0Id. §§4768(a), (b). 7Id. §4992.81d. §5000. - 9Il. §5003(a). -Id. §5105(1).
-Id. §5126(b). =Jd. §5268(ww). AId. §§5170, 5196.
U [d. §5205. -51d. §5212. 'Id. §5259(1).
17Id. §6055(j). - Id. §6274. "Id. §6298.
"Id. §6377. " Id. §6396. "Id. §6397(b).
"Id. §6476(n). = Id. §6500. Id. §6613.
-Id. §6649(8). ' Id. §6649(a). -Id. §6658.
-Id. §6691. "Id. §6702. -Id. §6715.
-Id. §6734. 8 Id. §6753(2). -Id. §6758.
Id. §§6766, 6767. -Id. §6781.
"Id. §§6943(c), 6970, 6976, 6978. -Id. §7002.
"Id. §7007(10). -1d. §§7024(b), 7024(f).
"Id. §7312(o).
IN. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1937) §5126(a 1).
"Id. §5168(kk). "Id. §5780(m2). "Id. §5780(m 10).
"Id. §5168(eee). t Id. §5168(ttt). -8Id. §5382(3).
"Id. §6476(dd). -Id. §7251(hh) 31. '2Id. §7312(cc).
'N. C. CoDE AN . (Michie, 1935) §2787(34).
" Ibid. Id. §3411(12).
"Id. §1297-26. "Id. §1297-25, 3411(13).
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states is similar.57 The Federal Government, within the field of its
limited powers, likewise is expanding its use of licensing.58
Here, then, is a movement establishing a type of legal control over
enterprise, which movement is nationwide, continuous, and inclusive.
So far as this kind of control relates to professions, such as dentistry,
medicine, or law, which hold within their control such vital matters as
the health of the people, or their means of access to justice, the estab-
lishment of such control may well represent a considered choice of
social policy by legislators. When legislators pass licensing laws in
such fields it is not hard to believe that the legislators are giving form to
their own convictions and to those of the general body of their constit-
uents. So also when legislatures decide that new public utilities should
not be set up without the official approval of a commission able to
judge whether such utilities are needed, or whether their presence
would impair the effectiveness of those already in the field, it is possible
to credit the legislators with making a thoughtful choice of a policy de-
signed to further the general welfare in securing to the public an ade-
quate supply of essential service. Similarly, when control by licensing
is established over enterprises having a bearing on the public morals,
such as pool and dance halls, or on the public safety, such as electrical
contracting, that control can be ascribed to a policy formulated by the
legislators or the public they represent. But what about control of
chiropodists, who in North Carolina may heal no feet unless authorized
to do so by a board appointed by the pedic association, that is, the
organization of the men already in the field? 59 What about tile contrac-
tors, that is, persons who undertake for profit to lay tile floors and
walls? No such "contractors" may lay any such floors or walls without
passing an examination and receiving a license from a board composed
of men already engaged in that occupation.60 What about photogra-
phers, who may enter the business only if licensed to do so by a board
on which sit five photographers ?61 (It is worth noticing that the new-
comer who desires to enter any one of these three fields must pay an
initial fee of $25,62 and annual fees thereafter.63 ) What about other
'Hoyt, Shaping Judicial Review of Administrative Tribunals (1937) 16 N. C.
L. REv. 1. Note that Wisconsin has set up a commission to examine and license
watchmakers.
'Koons, Growth of Federal Licensing (1936) 24 GEo. L. J. 293.
' N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §§6765, 6766.
IN. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1937) §§5168(ggg), 5168(jjj).
IN. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §§7007(2), 7007(10).
"Chiropodists, N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §6766; tile contractors, N. C.
CODE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1937) §5168(jjj); photographers, N. C. CODE ANN.
(Michie, 1935) §7007(13).
'Tile contractors $50, N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1937) §5168(kkk);
chiropodists not to exceed $10, N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §6773(a) ; photog-
raphers only $5, id. §7007(19).
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occupations such as these? Did the legislators after examination of the
needs of society come by themselves to the conclusion that trained and
qualified chiropodists are vital to the public interest? Or that tile
floors and walls, as distinguished from any other floors and walls, ought
in the public interest to be laid only by carefully examined and duly
licensed layers? Or that boughten photographs are so closely connected
with the general welfare that only licensed persons should be allowed
to take photographs for a price, whereas anyone may take them for
himself ? Did the man on the street put pressure on his representatives
in the legislature to protect him from unlicensed chiropodists, tile layers,
and photographers? If the answer to each of these questions is in the
negative, if control of such occupations as these represents no social
policy formulated either by the public or its representatives, then whence
has come the force strong enough to bring about the regulation by
license of so many ordinary occupations? A chorus of voices supplies
the answer. Many of these laws, it is suspected, are procured by men
already in these occupations in order to keep others out.04 A tart
and lucid declaration on this subject was made by the court of the state
of Washingfon as far back as 1906, in connection with a statute licens-
ing plumbers. "We are not permitted to inquire into the motive of the
Legislature, and yet, why should a court blindly declare that the public
health is involved, when all the rest of mankind know full well that the
control of the plumbing business by the board and its licensees is the
sole end in view." 65 An article appearing in the American Mercury
tells how the beauty parlor operators secured the passage of licensing
legislation in various states. The official organ of the American Cos-
meticians' Society is quoted as follows, "'These six laws were obtained
as a result of much self-sacrifice and hard work on the part of a small
group of women in each of these States. They have behind them some
fine organization work, personal enthusiasm that could not be dampened
by setbacks and misunderstandings, meetings without number, count-
less hours of telephoning, hundreds of personal interviews with legis-
lators, weeks given over to lobbying [italics ours] in the State capitals,
days of anxiety and disappointment, and a generous amount of that
necessary thing-co6peration."'
The article adds, "In Missouri success was not difficult because the
local branches of the American Cosmeticians' Society and the National
Hair-dressers' Association combined forces to push the bill through."0 0
"A Survey of Statutory Changes in North Carolina in 1937 (1937) 15 N. C.
L. REv. 321, 330; Patterson, Administrative Provisions for Licensing of Chiro-
practors, Chiropodists and Osteopaths (1921) 7 IowA L. BULL. 35, 36.
'State ex rel. Richey v. Smith, 42 Wash. 237, 248, 84 Pac. 851, 854 (1906).
This case, invalidating the licensing statute, was later overruled. Tacoma v.
Fox, 158 Wash. 325, 290 Pac. 1010 (1930).
' Fishbein, The Cult of Beauty (Feb. 1926) 7 AMERICAN MERCURY 161, 164.
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Newly elected legislators, before their trip to the state capital, if
asked whether persons should be obliged to pass examinations and ob-
tain expensive licenses before engaging in the ordinary occupations
of life would doubtless answer, "No." But it is by no means so easy
to say, "No," to a persistent group of people, all having votes, and rep-
resenting others who have votes, who want their businesses protected
by a licensing law. This is particularly true because the young men
and women who, in the future, will be kept from these occupations by
the law are not on hand, indeed are not yet identified. Their future as
tile layers or beauticians is foreclosed before their aspirations in such
directions have begun.
The first and greatest objection to all this is that we are moving
rapidly in the direction of regimenting even the most ordinarr callings
under official control, when it is doubtful whether the legislators or
the public desire any such state of affairs. It is doubtful whether even
the responsible pressure groups are in favor of a controlled economy;
they each merely want certain advantages to be gained for themselves
by one particular control statute. But these statutes added together
make a large scale trend. We are in danger of moving on to a desti-
nation and then discovering that none of us really wanted to go there.
A lesser disadvantage of enacting such miscellaneous control statutes
at the instance of diverse pressure groups is the needless variations in-
troduced into laws having a similar objective. A comparison of the
licensing statutes for dry cleaners and for photographers will do to
illustrate the point. All five members of the board of photographic
examiners must be experienced photographers.yt Only three members
of the dry cleaners commission are to be experienced dry cleaners;
the other two must be from the public at large.68 Why the difference?
The term of office for the photographers is three years,69 for the
dry cleaners four years.3  Why? The photographers are paid seven
dollars a day and expenses, 7 1 the dry cleaners five dollars a day and
traveling expenses.72 Is a photographer worth more than a dry
cleaner? The photographic examiners may appoint legal assistants.73
The dry cleaners commission may employ "such lawyers as may be
approved by the attorneys general."7 4 Are dry cleaners poorer judges
of legal talent than are photographers? If not, why must their choice
of lawyers be approved by the attorneys general, whereas the photog-
raphers can hire any lawyers they please? Legislative power is given
IN. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §7007(2).
I N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1937) §5382(2).
'See note 67, supra. " See note 68, supra.
IN. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §7007(4).
"See note 68, supra.
7N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §7007(9).
1' See note 68, supra.
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to the photographers by authorizing them to "adopt and enforce all
rules and orders necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter."7 5
The dry cleaners are authorized to adopt rules and regulations to con-
trol the dry cleaning, pressing and dyeing business in five specified par-
ticulars, including the enforcement of fire, sanitation, and labor laws,
and all other statute laws applicable to the industry, and the prohibition
of false or misleading statements, advertisements or guarantees.70 The
more poorly paid dry cleaners are not trusted to hire their own lawyers,
but they are endowed with very broad and important legislative powers.
The section authorizing the revocation of photographers' licenses by
the board adds the non-committal statement, "Provided, the accused
shall not be barred the right of appeal to the superior court." 77  This
enigmatic language may be construed as a back-handed provision for
appeal to the superior court. The statute contains no other provision
for such appeal. In contrast, if the dry cleaners commission either
refuses a license 'or suspends or revokes a license, right of appeal to the
superior court is expressly granted.78 Why the diversity in the two
statutes on the subject of judicial review? Are persons engaged in dry
cleaning better entitled to a safeguarding of their rights than are photog-
raphers? The criminal provisions of the dry cleaning statute make it
a misdemeanor to engage in the regulated business without a license.7 9
The criminal provisions of the photography statute make it a mis-
demeanor either to violate any of the provisions of the chapter, or to
engage in the regulated business without a license.8 0 Offending dry
cleaners are to be punished by a fine of not less than ten dollars nor
more than one hundred dollars. Offending photographers are to be
fined not less than fifty nor more than two hundred dollars for the first
offense. Why is it a much graver, or at least more costly, offense
against the state for a photographer to operate without a license than for
a dry cleaner to do the same thing? Subsequent offenses by photog-
raphers may draw a fine up to two hundred dollars, imprisonment not
to exceed thirty days, or both. There is no such provision in the case
of dry cleaners. Is a photographer who twice offends so much greater
a villain than a dry cleaner who twice offends that the former should
face a jail sentence, but not the latter?
Much space could be consumed pointing out additional differences
between the two statutes. Sometimes these differences are in mere
detail, sometimes in the most important provisions. Many of the differ-
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §7007(7).
"'N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1937) §5382(3).
IN. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §7007(23) (d).
See note 76, supra.
IN. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1937) §5382(7).'
I'N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §7007(24).
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ences have one similarity; they are without any perceptible explanation
No visible policy accounts for them. Their presence can be ascribed to
the circumstance that one industrial group produced one piece of legis-
lation, another group produced the other. Neither group was interested
in the legislation of the other, nor in bringing about uniformity, nor in
otherwise perfecting the law or its policies.
A similar condition may be found in other .North Carolina licensing
statutes. The great diversity in the provisions for judicial review in the
statutes regulating various enterprises has already been brought to light
in an article in this law review.8' These statutory provisions range
from total silence on the subject of judicial review to trial de novo in
the superior court. There is no justification for the purposeless diversi-
ties. It might be argued that many varieties of provisions have value
as experiments, but such a mass of differences as now exist are likely
to obscure and confuse the results, muddling our experience as badly
as the laws under which the experience is gained are muddled. It
would be wiser to frame a model form for a statute licensing occupa-
tions, and then to deviate from that form in statutes for particular
occupations only when special conditions justify such deviations.82
Experience could then be centered on perfecting the model form.
A many times more serious lack of uniformity in the law lies in the
choice of occupations to be regulated. If the North Carolina citizen
goes down the main street of his town and turns into a photographer's
shop he is protected by the police power of his state which has, in legal
theory at least, been exerted in his behalf by requiring the photographer
to secure a license. The same thing holds true if he stops at the dry
cleaner's shop. But if he stops at the clothing store or the grocer's
he is protected in no such fashion by statewide law. Can it be argued
that he has less interest at stake in the grocer's business or the clothier's
than he has in the photographer's or the dry cleaner's? That there
is less likelihood that he will be imposed upon by the clothier than
by the photographer? Or that he cares less about the way the grocery
is conducted than he does about the way the dry cleaner's business
is operated? Is not the truth exactly the opposite; that the unlicensed
clothing and grocery businesses are of far more public concern than the
licensed photography and dry cleaning businesses? Although the photog-
rapher and dry cleaner have been singled out for regulation on
the theory that their trades are matters of public importance, is the
truth not rather that licensing was relatively easy to impose here because
the public did not care much one way or the other? On the other
" See note 57, supra.
' Long ago a single code of procedure for various licensing boards, to be in-
corporated in specific statutes by reference, was suggested. Patterson, supra
note 64, at 39.
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hand the public might be considerably aroused if it were to be con-
fronted with the prospect that no man in the future could open a grocery
store without a license from a board manned by men already in the gro-
cery business. Why has not the legislature provided for the licensing
of farmers? Certainly farming is of incomparably more importance
to the public than dry cleaning. Indeed there is legislation already on
the statute books of the state in effect declaring a public interest in the
manner in which farm lands are used, and providing elaborate admin-
istrative machinery to regulate that use to the end that the soil be
conserved. 83 Why not secure this objective by requiring all persons
in future to stand examination and procure licenses before they may
become farmers? If we look to the real motive for the licensing of many
ordinary occupations, namely, to keep down competition, the farmers are
at least as much entitled to such protection as are beauty culturists, for
the farmers have long been suffering from the consequences of over-
production. If we look to the ostensible motive for licensing laws,
namely the protection of the public welfare, the licensing of farmers
would be far more defensible than the licensing of tile contractors.
Bad farming and overproduction on the farm are recognized as acute
national problems of concern to the whole people. There is no acute
problem from the public standpoint in tile laying. So far as the public
is concerned, in many instances there is more reason for licensing where
it does not exist than where it does. But in the case of such occupa-
tions as farming and storekeeping proposed license laws would bring
home vividly to the public the danger it is running of losing its oppor-
tunity to engage freely in ordinary occupations. Men who dream of
some day opening their own stores, or achieving independence by be-
coming small farmers of some kind, would be shocked into realization
that in the name of the public interest there is being sacrificed one of
the greatest of public interests, namely, free choice of the ordinary
means of living.
Even in the absence of any such shock as would result from the
licensing of such an occupation as farming, there is arising an uneasy
suspicion that those on the inside of many fields of endeavor have so
effectively barred the doors that great numbers of our youths are find-
ing it increasingly difficult to break in anywhere. This condition con-
tributes to unemployment, and to the sense of futility when increasing
numbers of people are obliged to turn to made work afforded by govern-
ment. Nor is it a satisfactory answer to say that any youth who wants
to be a photographer or tile layer can study for the examination, com-
ply with the regulations, and pay the fees. A young man who might
otherwise begin in a small way to take pictures or develop films for
1 N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1937) §7395(34)- (46).
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others, and gradually build up a business, is likely to be deterred by the
prospect of a stiff examination and fees in excess of the few dollars
in sight at the time he otherwise would begin.
But whether licensing restriction of the ordinary occupations is good
policy or whether it is bad policy, at least it is time that the choice were
being made, and then consistently followed. Licensing legislation has
had its trial period; it has demonstrated its value in those professions
where special competence is essential to such vital public interests as
health; the time has come either to accept it as good policy for ordinary
occupations also, or to reject it as such policy. If accepted, it is time
to apply it by systematic extension to other occupations on the merits.
It is likewise time to frame a standard licensing law, to be deviated
from in the case of any particular occupation only when there is reason
for, the deviation. On the other hand; if such a policy is emphatically
not wanted, why should it be adopted piecemeal, one unimportant occu-
pation at a time, simply because no one objects very much to each suc-
cessive step urged on the legislature by a tight little group with an axe
to grind?
Although the legislature is the body which ought to shoulder the
job of bringing orderly, well-considered law out of our present hap-
hazard regimentation, there is still the problem of the constitutionality
of the licensing statutes already adopted, or which may be adopted if
licensing is recognized as a desirable policy to be followed generally in
the case of ordinary occupations. This problem, of course, is for the
courts.
Licensing statutes may be attacked on the ground that any such regu-
lation of the occupation involved is unconstitutional, or on the ground
that although a proper licensing statute would be valid, still the particu-
lar statute in question is defective in one or more details. Such
deficiencies in detail may be lack of proper notice and hearing in case a
license is revoked, lack of statutory standards to guide the licensing
board in granting or revoking licenses, and the like. This article is
not concerned with invalidity arising from particular flaws in the
statute.8 4 Attack on the validity of any licensing regulation at all of
the occupation involved commonly centers on the question whether such
regulation is within the police power of the state. If not within the police
power, the regulation is likely to collide with such constitutional guaran-
tees as the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, or similar clauses of state constitu-
tions, because under the Fourteenth Amendment the liberty of which
the citizen may not be deprived without due process includes liberty to
"For a discussion of this subject see Legis. (1925) 25 COL. L. REv. 220.
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engage in any of the common occupations.85 The question thus becomes
one of boundary between the polic6 power and the due process limita-
tion. An orthodox view of the police power is that it includes power
to protect the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare. Licens-
ing legislation, although it does restrict liberty to enter an occupation, is
valid if reasonably calculated to protect the public health, safety, morals,
or general welfare. These standards are simple but broad; their appli-
cation is comprehensible but uncertain. Most of the division of judicial
opinion as to whether certain occupations can be licensed or not arises
from disagreement on the question whether the licensing involved does
or does not further these objectives. Protection of the public welfare,
in particular, is a vague standard. It was given somewhat more definite
meaning in the classic statement of Mr. Justice Holmes, "It may be said
in a general way that the police power extends to all the great public
needs.... It may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage,
or held by the prevailing morality or strong and preponderant opinion to
be greatly and immediately necessary to the public welfare."8 0 General
welfare thus conceived does not cover mere small advantages to the pub-
lic, it includes rather the vital interests of the public.
Quite as one would expect, where businesses8 7 or occupations plainly
and extensively affect the public health, safety, morals, or welfare, the
requirement of official permission by license or otherwise to engage
therein has been held constitutional. Thus it is valid to require those
who practice medicine to procure licenses.88 This result is entirely
"See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399, 43 Sup. Ct. 625, 626, 67 L. ed.
1042, 1045 (1923).
1 Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 111, 31 Sup. Ct. 186, 188,
55 L. ed. 112, 116 (1911).
9 It is not proposed in this article to examine the subject of certificates of con-
venience and necessity required for public utilities and businesses affected with a
public interest. Suffice it to say that this category of businesses for which official
permission must be secured has long existed, is commonly recognized, and has
been frequently and exhaustively discussed. A relatively recent decision discussing
the subject is New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 52 Sup. Ct. 371, 76
L. ed. 747 (1932). The court held unconstitutional the requirement of a license
for the business of manufacturing, selling, and distributing ice.
The admission of lawyers to the bar likewise will not be discussed herein.
There is no right to practice law; when the practice of law is restricted by statute
the question is not whether the police power has been validly exercised to diminish
a right. Rather, the practice of law is regarded as a privilege or franchise derived
from the statute. In re Investigation of Conduct of Examination for Admission
to Practice Law, 1 Cal. (2d) 61, 33 P. (2d) 829 (1934) ; see In re Carver, 224
Mass. 169, 112 N. E. 877, 879 (1916). Because this different type of legal view-
point is involved the subject of admission to the bar is not included in our
examination and discussion of the validity of licensing statutes.
" Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 9 Sup. Ct 231, 32 L. ed. 623 (1889);
State v. Call, 121 N. C. 643, 28 S. E. 517 (1897). In this latter case the question
was raised whether the statute created a monopoly within the prohibition of the
state constitution. The court decided that no monopoly was created since anyone
possessing the specified requirements and passing the examinationi could obtain a
license.
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warranted in view of the bearing of such a requirement on the protec-
tion of the public health. Likewise valid is licensing regulation of den-
tists,89 and of various types of practitioners who heal without the use
of drugs, such as osteopaths and chiropractors. 90 Optometrists may be
licensed,91 but it has been held that the regulation may not, by the
definition of optometry, be extended to the giving of any aid by mer-
chants to customers in selecting glasses. Where a merchant kept a
mechanical device to aid customers in selecting lenses, this was said to
be an incident to an ordinary business and could not be brought within
the police power.9 2  Licensing of embalmers is sustained.93  Difficul-
ties are again encountered when licensing regulation is imposed upon
the barbering trade. This regulation is on less firm ground than the
licensing of doctors and dentists for two reasons. First, the doctor or
dentist deals directly with the public health; his activities are designed
to promote it; whereas the barber's primary function is to remove hair,
and public health is involved only incidentally. Almost all occupations
affect the public health to some extent. Second, a much higher degree
of capacity is required for doctors and dentists, and licensing regulations
insuring that capacity have a larger scale duty to perform. The ac-
quaintance with public health required for barbering is more elemen-
tary, and approaches the field of common knowledge. Although licens-
ing regulation of barbering is near the outer boundary of legitimate
exercise of the police power9 4 for the protection of public health, never-
theless it is still within the boundary. Barber licensing is sustained.9 5
But when barber licensing statutes use the pretext of connection with
public health to regulate barbering as a whole, some courts draw the
line. If barbering may be regulated because it involves public health, then
the regulations may not go beyond requirements having to do with
health.96 Questions on the examination for barbers may not go into such
matters as the proper way to cut hair or give a shave. Such questions
have nothing to do with public health.9 7 Licensing of beauticians is like-
wise sustained by reason of relation to the public health.9 8 But here again
'State v. Hicks, 143 N. C. 689, 57 S. E. 441 (1907) ; Douglas v. Noble, 261
U. S. 165, 43 Sup. Ct. 303, 67 L. ed. 590 (1923) semb'e; (1927) 5 N. C. L. REv.
257.
' State v. Siler, 169 N. C. 314, 84 S. E. 1015 (1915).
z Price v. State, 168 Wis. 603, 171 N. W. 77 (1919).
'Bruhl v. State, 111 Tex. Cr. App. 233, 13 S. W. (2d) 93 (1929).
'Beard v. State Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors, 111 Cal. App.
559, 295 Pac. 1052 (1931) semble.
See Dasch v. Jackson, 170 Md. 251, 266, 183 Atl. 534, 540 (1936).
Cooper v. Rollins, 152 Ga. 588, 110 S. E. 726 (1922); State v. Lockey, 198
N. C. 551, 152 S. E. 693 (1930).
'Schneider v. Duer, 170 Md. 326, 184 Atl. 914 (1936); Banghart v. Walsh,
339 Ill. 132, 171 N. E. 154 (1930).
'Timmons v. Morris, 271 Fed. 721 (W. D. Wash. 1921).
'State ex rel. Dally v. Woodall, 225 Ala. 178, 142 So. 838 (1932) ; State v.
Ross, 185 S. C. 472, 194 S. E. 439 (1937).
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the regulations, according to some courts, may not go beyond what is
required to safeguard health. A beauty culture statute was held un-
constitutional partly on the ground that the regulations exceeded those
necessary for any such purpose. The court pointed out that the pro-
visions of the act were designed primarily to limit the numbers who
could enter the field.90 Statutes regulating beauty culture commonly
include in their scope beautifying processes having little relation to pub-
lic health. One such statute was held unconstitutional as to a person
who curled hair and did nothing else.100 The connection between pub-
lic health and plumbing is found sufficient by some courts to support
licensing regulation.' 01 But a plumbing statute may not include drain-
layers and oblige them to meet the requirements for plumbers.' 0 2 One
court decided that plumbers' licensing is beyond the boundary of the
police power. The court found no sufficient connection between such
regulation and the public health, but did find visible a purpose to keep
out competition. 103 A statute creating a board of paper-hangers to
examine and license persons engaging in that occupation Was held to be
beyond the police power. So far as the public health was concerned,
paper-hanging was held to be no different from such unlicensed occu-
pations as carpentry and bricklaying. 104 Licensing regulation by the
commissioner of agriculture of farm produce wholesalers was held to
violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution since the regula-
tion applied only to wholesalers of farm produce. 0 5
The use of the police power to further or protect the public safety
presents the same type of problem as the use of that power in aid of
the public health. If a doctrine were formulated and literally applied
to the effect that any occupation affecting public safety may be regu-
lated by license, then nearly all means of livelihood could be licensed,
9 Hoff v'. State, 197 Atl. 75 (Del. Super. Ct. 1938).
"Baker v. Daly, 15 F. "(2d) 881 (D. Ore. 1926).
"'Roach v. Durham, 204 N. C. 587, 169 S. E. 149 (1933) ; State v. District
Court, 64 N. D. 399, 253 N. W. 744 (1934) ; Tacoma v. Fox, 158 Wash. 325, 290
Pac. 1010 (1930).
11' Scully v. Hallihan, 365 Ill. 185, 6 N. E. (2d) 176 (1936).
"'Replogle v. Little Rock, 166 Ark. 617, 267 S. W. 353 (1924).
'" Dasch v. Jackson, 170 Md. 251, 183 Atl. 534 (1936). The framers of the
statute hopefully worded the board's authority in part as follows: to "adopt such
rules and regulations for the examinations of paper-hangers as herein defined,
and for the carrying on of the business of paper-hanging in such manner as to
protect and promote the public health, safety and general welfare," etc. Thus the
very things the board was to do were the things which the law says may be done
under the police power. This strategy did not work.
""State v. Chisesi, 187 La. 675, 175 So. 453 (1937). Accord: Valentine v.
Berrien Circuit Judge, 124 Mich. 664, 83 N. W. 594 (1900). Contra: State v.
Wagener, 77 Minn. 483, 80 N. W. 633 (1899). Licensing of milk-gathering stations
has been upheld. People v. Perretta, 253 N. Y. 305, 171 N. E. 72 (1930). A city
may validly, require a license or permit to sell milk, State v. Kirkpatrick, 179
N. C. 747, 103 S. E. 65 (1920), operate a restaurant, State v. Snipes, 161 N. C.
242, 76 S. E. 243 (1912), or operate a meat market, McIntyre v. Murphy, 177
N. C. 300, 98 S. E. 820 (1919).
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for almost any occupation which one person engages in may endanger
others. Even snow-shovelers could be licensed, for poor snow shoveling
may leave behind slippery spots. However, there are some occupa-
tions which are especially connected with public safety, and which re-
quire special competence to insure that safety. One such occupation is
the practice of architecture. Licensing regulation of this profession is
valid.' 0 6 Also constitutional is the licensing of electricians, 0 7 electri-
cal contractors,' 08 general contractors,' 0 9 and operators of stationary
steam boilers.110 Licensing of dry cleaners by the fire marshal has
been sustained,' but it should be remembered that regulation in the
interest of public safety directed to keeping down fire hazard may be
supported without justifying regulation aimed at securing the proper
pressing of clothes. Examinations and licenses for motion picture oper-
ators may be required, again to reduce fire hazard."12 Locomotive
engineers may be subjected to state examinations and be required to
secure licenses as a safety measure. 1 13 However, the court of fllinois
balked at sustaining a statute aimed at securing the better education of
practitioners of horseshoeing, and providing examinations for them.
The court was unable to find any reasonable relationship between this
legislation and the proper objectives of the police power."14 This de-
cision is sound on both law and policy, and yet it is easy to see a rela-
tionship between proper horseshoeing and public safety in the horse and
buggy days when this case was decided. The decision re-illustrates the
important point that some small and ordinary connection between an
occupation and the public safety does not justify licensing regulation,
unless we are to support such regulation of practically all occupations.
Licensing in the interest of the public morals has long been recog-
nized as a legitimate exercise of the police power. Enterprises having
a tendency to endanger public morals may be licensed."15
I State Board of Examiners for Architects and Engineers v. Rogers, 167
Tenn. 374, 69 S. W. (2d) 1093 (1934). Architecture is also related to the public
health.
I Becker v. Pickersgill, 150 N. J. L. 51, 143 AUt. 859 (1928).
Milwaukee v. Rissling, 184 Wis. 517, 199 N. W. 61 (1924) semble. Contra:
Southeastern Electric Co. v. Atlanta, 179 Ga. 514, 176 S. E. 400 (1934).
'Hunt v. Douglas Lumber Co., 41 Ariz. 276, 17 P. (2d) 8151 (1933). The
statute contained provisions designed to insure honesty on the part of the con-
tractors. These provisions are of more dubious validity, but the court approved
them as regulations for the prevention of fraud. For an expression of doubt as
to the validity of the North Carolina statute regulating contractors as the statute
then existed see (1926) 26 CoL. L. REV. 472, 474.
Bradford v. Houston, 4 S. W. (2d) 592 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
'Ex parte Weisberg, 215 Cal. 624, 12 P. (2d) 446 (1932).
1 State ex rel. Ebert v. Loden, 117 Md. 373, 83 Atl. 564 (1912).
'McDonald v. State, 81 Ala. 279, 2 So. 829 (1886).
"' Bessette v. People, 193 Ill. 334, 62 N. E. 215 (1901).
Pool halls: State ex rel. Sayles v. Superior Ct., 120 Wash. 183, 206 Pac. 966
(1922) ; cf. Murphy v. California, 225 U. S. 623, 32 Sup. Ct. 697, 56 L. ed. 1229(1912). Dance halls: Chung Mee Restaurant Co. v. Healy, 36 N. H. 483, 171
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Regulation of the type under discussion has been visited on many
occupations in the name of the general welfare. One such occupation is
accounting.1 6 Statutes requiring certificates of authority before any-
one is permitted to hold himself out as a certified public accountant are
plainly valid. 1 7 No one is obliged to meet the requirements except
those who, in substance, want to be certified as -having done so.11 8
But when all public accountants are required to obtain certificates or
licenses, the statutes have been held unconstitutional. They are not
within the police power to protect the general welfare.119 The Wis-
consin court, however, upheld a statute requiring that certificates of
authority be secured from the state board of accountancy by all persons
holding themselves out to the public as skilled in accountancy. 120 This,
said the court, is a valid exercise of the police power in the interest of
public welfare. The court pointed to the greatly enlarged field of
accountancy in connection with tax laws, security issue laws, social
security legislation, public utility rate regulation, and the like. In dis-
tinguishing the Wisconsin statute from those elsewhere held invalid,
the court called attention to the fact that the Wisconsin law expressly
excepted bookkeepers. The position taken by the Wisconsin court is
commendable. The profession of accounting has a special relation to
the public welfare by reason, among other things, of its effect on the
operation of highly important legislation having to do with the general
welfare. But it is hard to see any reason why the ordinary occupation
of keeping books for several employers should be subjected to licensing.
The police power has been held to extend to licensing regulation of real
estate brokers. 12 1 The Kentucky court, however, declared unconsti-
tutional a statute providing such regulation. The court found particularly
obnoxious a requirement that the real estate brokers be of good moral
At. 263 (1934); Bungalow Amusement Co. v. Seattle, 148 Wash. 485, 269
Pac. 1043 (1928). The court in the latter case adds that the regulation could
extend to the point of prohibition. The liquor traffic also can be regulated to the
point of prohibition. Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25, 24 L. ed. 989(1877); Eberle v, People, 232 U. S. 700, 34 Sup. Ct. 464, 58 L. ed. 803 (1914).
The court in the latter case said, 232 U. S. at 706, 34 Sup. Ct. at 466, 58 L. ed.
at 806 that the sale of intoxicating liquors could be prohibited absolutely, or sale
by merchants could be prohibited while sale by licensed druggists was permitted.
'For a discussion of this type of regulation of accounting see (1937) 21
MARQ. L. Rav. 93.
u Henry v. State, 97 Tex. Cr. Rep. 67, 260 S. W. 190 (1924).11 Legis. (1926) 26 CoL. L. REv. 472, n. 6 calls attention to statutes providing
for certified shorthand reporters and registered nurses.
'Frazer v. Shelton, 320 Ill. 253, 15a N. E. 696 (1926) ; State ex rel. Short
v. Reidell, 109 Okl. 35, 233 Pac. 684 (1924); Campbell v. McIntyre, 165 Tenn.
47, 52 S. W. (2d) 162 (1932).
'Wangerin v. Wis. State Board of Accountancy, 223 Wis. 179, 270 N. W. 57(1936) ; cf. State ex rel. McCullough v. Scott, 182 N. C. 865, 880, 109 S. E. 789,
797, 798 (1921).
'State ex rel. Davis v. Rose, 97 Fla. 710, 122 So. 225 (1929) ; Camp v. State,
171 Ga. 25, 154 S. E. 436 (1930).
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character. The business of real estate brokers, according to the court,
was no more likely to be injurious to the public welfare than any other
business. If this statute were supported, the state could require proof
of good character in order to engage in any business.122 Licensing regu-
lation of abstracters of title has been sustained.123 Statutes providing
for the licensing of those who sell securities have been properly up-
held,12 4 since there is here a more than ordinary danger of fraud. Em-
ployment agencies also may be regulated in this fashion.125  Experience
has demonstrated that here also there is unusual likelihood of imposi-
tion. Licensing of itinerant vendors of drugs while not licensing drug
stores has been sustained. 126 Pawnbrokers, 127 secondhand dealers,128
and auctioneers129 may be licensed. Even the licensing of coal dealers
has been sustained, partly on the ground of opportunity for fraud in the
weighing, since the purchasers had no opportunity to weigh the coal.'
3 0
But under the guise of regulating sweat shops a city may not license
all clothing stores.13
This review of some of the decisions on the question of the validity
of statutes or ordinances providing for regulation of occupations by
licensing makes it apparent that where the occupation has no special
relationship to public health, safety, morals, or welfare the courts have
a well-established 'basis for invalidating the regulation. Courts can, if
they choose, preserve from such control the ordinary callings. Where
the licensing is statewide and is to be done by a commission or agency
composed of men already in the business to be licensed, the courts may
' Rawles v. Jenkins, 212 Ky. 287, 279 S. W. 350 (1926). This case was cited
with approval; in State v. Warren, 211 N. C. 75, 78, 189 S. E. 108, 110 (1937),
which invalidated a North Carolina statute providing -for the licensing of real
estate brokers on the ground that the act was limited to certain counties.
2m State ex rel. Freeman v. Abstracters Board of Examiners, 99 Mont. 564,
45 P. (2d) 668 (1935).
12 State v. Agey, 171 N. C. 831, 88 S. E. 726 (1916) ; State ex rel. Smith v.
Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Baltimore, Md., 191 N. C. 643, 132 S. E. 792 (1926) ;
Halsey, Stuart & Co. v. Piblic Serv. Comm., 212 Wis. 184, 248 N. W. 458
(1933).
'" Brazee v. People, 241 U. S. 340, 36 Sup. Ct. 561, 60 L. ed. 1034 (1915);
Commissioner of Labor v. Clark, 101 N. J. L. 223, 127 AtI. 550 (1925). However,
procurement of employment for others for pay may not be entirely forbidden.
Adams v. Tanner, 244 U. S. 590, 37 Sup. Ct. 662, 61 L. ed. 1336 (1917). Nor may
the charge for such service be limited to ten per cent of the earnings of the
employee. Ex parte Dickey, 144 Cal. 234, 77 Pac. 924 (1904).
's People v. Kupusinac, 261! Mich. 398, 246 N. W. 159 (1933).
Grand Rapids v. Braudy, 105 Mich. 670, 64 N. W. 29 (1895); Asakura v.
Seattle, 122 Wash. 81, 210 Pac. 30 (1922).
"*Lewis v. Quinn, 217 Cal. 410, 19 P. (2d) 236 (1933).
2People ex rel. Schwab v. Grant, 126 N. Y. 473, 27 N E. 964 (1891) ; San
Antonio v. South Trunk Co., 13 S. W. (2d) 401 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929). But cf.
Empire Home Furnishers v. White, 235 App. Div. 522, 258 N. Y.1 Supp. 3 (3d
Dep't 1932) (Auction sales of ordinary commodities by a merchant may not be
subjected to license, since they do not involve health or morals.)
21 Jacobs v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 191 Atl. 421 (Md. 1937).
m Nature's Rival Co. v. Chicago, 324 Ill. 566, 155 N. E. 356 (1927).
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well insist on being shown that the regulation is in the interest of those
public purposes nurtured by the police power.1 82 Of course, it may be
argued that the trend of the times is in the direction of complete sub-
ordination of the individual to his government, that licensing regula-
tion is part of the trend, and that courts can not thwart that trend. It is
true that courts can not hold back the inevitable. Biut they can do much
good in restraining mass inroads on individual liberty until those inroads
have proved themselves inevitable. Otherwise put it is true that the
courts should not arbitrarily override the will of the people. However,
they can and should restrain mass inroads on individual liberty until
those inroads have been consciously and continuously approved by the
majority of the citizens.
In the light of the above discussion the significance of a recent North
Carolina "case'33 upholding a statute13 4 providing for the licensing of
photographers will be examined. The statute embodies a common
scheme. A board composed of photographers is set up, which is to
examine and license those who desire in the future to become photog-
raphers, and which has authority, for prescribed cause, to revoke
licenses. The board is expressly empowered to require proof of the
technical qualifications, business record, and moral character of appli-
cants, and to give a written, oral, or practical examination or combina-
tion of these covering photography and photo-finishing. The statute,
without any flat-footed requirement in the matter, makes it plain that
preliminary study with a licensed photographer is expected of appli-
cants.' 3 5 Attack was made on the statute on the ground that it vio-
lated various state and federal constitutional provisions, including the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court held,
however, that the statute came within the police power of the state. As
a specific reason for thinking so the court pointed to the fire hazard
involved in the use by photographers &f chemicals, celluloid, and other
combustible materials. This reasoning lacks force; even if photography
involves any special fire hazard, the licensing regulation here involved
is specifically directed toward competence in taking pictures. This
goes away beyond preventing fires. The court refers to the use of
pictures to illustrate sworn testimony in court, and overlooks entirely
the fact that pictures can be so used regardless of whether they are taken
by a licensed photographer or any private person. The statute does not
protect the quality of pictures offered in evidence. The court says
photographs are used to detect forgeries, and in connection with finger-
'Legis. (1926) 26 CoL. L. Rzv. 472, 473.
' State v. Lawrence, 213 N. C. 674, 197 S. E. 586 (1938). Certiorari was
denied by the United States Supreme Court (1938) 6 U. S. L. WEEK 178, 182.
IN. C. CODE Am. (Michie; 1935) §§7007(1)-(29).
'Id. §7007(16).
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prints. True, but not true only of photographs taken by licensed photog-
raphers. The court argues that photographs are used in advertising
as samples, and that dishonest photographs can therefore be used to
perpetrate fraud. Would anyone bent on fraud hesitate to take a
deceptive picture himself? If not, the statute has no bearing; it covers
only photographers engaged in business as such and has no application
to pictures taken by anyone else. Photographs are used in newspapers
and magazines says the court, ignoring the fact that the statute expressly
excepts from its operation any person in the employ of a newspaper
or periodical. One gathers from the opinion that even a court anxious
to sustain the act could find little legal justification for doing so in any
aspect of photography differentiating it from other occupations. But
the court points out that photography requires skill. Are all occupa-
tions requiring skill to be brought within the licensing power? The
answer, apparently, is, "Yes." "The court says, quoting with approval
from an earlier case, "'It is not to be questioned that the lawmaking
power of a state has the right to require an examination and certifi-
cate as to the competency of persons desiring to ... exercise other call-
ings, whether skilled trades or professions, affecting the public and
which require skill and proficiency.' "18 The court further says, "Com-
petency and ability are required to guard against imposition of an
unskilled photographer upon the public which we think is a proper
object for the exertion of the police power."'13
More important still is the court's declaration, "The matter is largely
in the discretion of the General Assembly as to what professions and
occupations are within the police power of the State and subject to
regulation."'13 8  Here is probably the real reason for the decision; the
court is leaving to the legislature responsibility for the choice of policy
as to what businesses shall be regulated.
The position taken by the majority of the court must have been
taken deliberately and with full realization of its import, for the ma-
jority had to face a vigorous and unusually able dissent. The heart of
the dissent is the proposition that this licensing statute can further no
public interest comparable in importance with the public's interest in
free opportunity for individuals to engage in ordinary occupations.
Only two other cases have been found on the validity of licensing
statutes for photographers. Both stand opposed to the North Carolina
decision. One, a Hawaii case, 13 9 is squarely in point, and holds such a
statute invalid. The court points out that no business, however inno-
State v. Lawrence, 213 N. C. 674, 679, 197 S. E. 586, 589 (1938).
State v. Lawrence, 213 N. C. 674, 680, 197 S. E. 586, 590 (1938).
" State v. Lawrence, 213 N. C. 674, 679, 197 S. E. 586, 589 (1938). The
court adds that due regard must be had, however, to constitutional provisions.
2Territory v. Kraft, 33 Hawaii 397 (1937).
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cent and harmless, is free from the possibility of becoming in some
degree harmful to the public interest. The shining of shoes improperly
done might injure the leather. No special public interest requires regu-
lation of photography. It is not within the police power. The court
contends that there is as great peril in the injudicious extension of the
police power as in its injudicious restriction.
The other case involving the validity of a statute licensing photog-
raphers arose in Tennessee.140 The court decided that the statute was
not passed in the legislature by proper procedure, but indicated by way
of dictum that it was unconstitutional in any event. The court said,
"We find it difficult to perceive just how the licensing of photographers
and regulation of the taking and finishing of pictures . . . 'has any real
tendency to protect the public safety, the public health or the public
morals'; or how and why 'the interests of the public generally, as dis-
tinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference'
as this Act provides."'141
If the North Carolina decision and its reasoning are consistently
adhered to by the North Carolina court in future cases, the gates are
open for licensing regulation of occupations generally in this state.
Squarely on the legislature rests the responsibility to choose whether we
are to have a policy of licensing ordinary occupations. If such a policy
is adopted it is time for orderly, consistent, systematic development of
such a policy. If we are to have regimentation, let us at least have
better regimentation.
Of course, human nature being what it is and legislatures being what
they are, we shall in actual practice continue to have miscellaneous, hap-
hazard licensing regulation brought about by the pressure of interested
groups. The legislation will continue to serve the aims of these groups
in the name of the public welfare. A horde of guardians of the public
health, safety, morals, and welfare will continue to crowd forward. If
we are ever to approach anything like orderly lawmaking adequately
embodying a consistent policy actually designed to further the public
interest, there must also be pressure for such an objective. This article
is a step in that direction.
'Wright v. Wiles, 117 S. W. (2d) 736 (Tenn. 1938).l' Wright v. Wiles, 117 S. W. (2d) 736, 738 (Tenn. 1938).
